Skip to main content

TLS 1.2 is in Feature Freeze
draft-ietf-tls-tls12-frozen-02

The information below is for an old version of the document.
Document Type
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Active".
Authors Rich Salz , Nimrod Aviram
Last updated 2024-12-03 (Latest revision 2024-08-20)
Replaces draft-rsalz-tls-tls12-frozen
RFC stream Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
Formats
Reviews
Additional resources Mailing list discussion
Stream WG state In WG Last Call
Document shepherd (None)
IESG IESG state I-D Exists
Consensus boilerplate Unknown
Telechat date (None)
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)
draft-ietf-tls-tls12-frozen-02
Transport Layer Security                                         R. Salz
Internet-Draft                                       Akamai Technologies
Intended status: Informational                                 N. Aviram
Expires: 21 February 2025                                 20 August 2024

                      TLS 1.2 is in Feature Freeze
                     draft-ietf-tls-tls12-frozen-02

Abstract

   TLS 1.2 is in widespread use and can be configured such that it
   provides good security properties.  TLS 1.3 is also in widespread use
   and fixes some known deficiencies with TLS 1.2, such as removing
   error-prone cryptographic primitives and encrypting more of the
   traffic so that it is not readable by outsiders.

   Both versions have several extension points, so items like new
   cryptographic algorithms, new supported groups (formerly "named
   curves"), etc., can be added without defining a new protocol.  This
   document specifies that outside of urgent security fixes, no new
   features will be approved for TLS 1.2.  This prescription does not
   pertain to DTLS (in any DTLS version); it pertains to TLS only.

About This Document

   This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

   Status information for this document may be found at
   https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls12-frozen/.

   Discussion of this document takes place on the Transport Layer
   Security Working Group mailing list (mailto:tls@ietf.org), which is
   archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/tls/.  Subscribe
   at https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls/.

   Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
   https://github.com/tlswg/tls12-frozen.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Salz & Aviram           Expires 21 February 2025                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                tls1.2-frozen                  August 2024

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 21 February 2025.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
   described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Implications for post-quantum cryptography  . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   5.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     5.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     5.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4

1.  Introduction

   TLS 1.2 [TLS12] is in widespread use and can be configured such that
   it provides good security properties.

   TLS 1.3 [TLS13] is also in widespread use and fixes most known
   deficiencies with TLS 1.2, such as encrypting more of the traffic so
   that it is not readable by outsiders and removing most cryptographic
   primitives now considered weak.  Importantly, TLS 1.3 enjoys robust
   security proofs and provides excellent security as-is.

Salz & Aviram           Expires 21 February 2025                [Page 2]
Internet-Draft                tls1.2-frozen                  August 2024

   Both versions have several extension points, so items like new
   cryptographic algorithms, new supported groups (formerly "named
   curves"), etc., can be added without defining a new protocol.  This
   document specifies that outside of urgent security fixes, no new
   features will be approved for TLS 1.2.  This prescription does not
   pertain to DTLS (in any DTLS version); it pertains to TLS only.

2.  Conventions and Definitions

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCPÂ 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

3.  Implications for post-quantum cryptography

   Cryptographically relevant quantum computers, once available, will
   have a huge impact on RSA, FFDH, and ECC which are currently used in
   TLS.  In 2016, the US National Institute of Standards and Technology
   started a multi-year effort to standardize algorithms that will be
   "safe" once quantum computers are feasible [PQC].  First IETF
   discussions happened around the same time [CFRGSLIDES].

   While the industry is waiting for NIST to finish standardization, the
   IETF has several efforts underway.  A working group was formed in
   early 2023 to work on use of PQC in IETF protocols, [PQUIPWG].
   Several other working groups, including TLS [TLSWG], are working on
   drafts to support hybrid algorithms and identifiers, for use during a
   transition from classic to a post-quantum world.

   For TLS it is important to note that the focus of these efforts is
   TLS 1.3 or later.  Put bluntly, post-quantum cryptography for TLS 1.2
   WILL NOT be supported (see Section 4).

4.  IANA Considerations

   IANA will stop accepting registrations for any TLS parameters
   [TLS13REG] except for the following:

   *  TLS Exporter Labels

   *  TLS Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) Protocol IDs

   Entries in any other TLS protocol registry should have an indication
   like "For TLS 1.3 or later" in their entry.

5.  References

Salz & Aviram           Expires 21 February 2025                [Page 3]
Internet-Draft                tls1.2-frozen                  August 2024

5.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.

   [TLS12]    Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5246>.

   [TLS13]    Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446>.

   [TLS13REG] Salowey, J. and S. Turner, "IANA Registry Updates for TLS
              and DTLS", RFC 8447, DOI 10.17487/RFC8447, August 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8447>.

5.2.  Informative References

   [CFRGSLIDES]
              McGrew, D., "Post Quantum Secure Cryptography Discussion",
              n.d., <https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/95/slides/slides-
              95-cfrg-4.pdf>.

   [PQC]      "Post-Quantum Cryptography", January 2017,
              <https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-
              cryptography>.

   [PQUIPWG]  "Post-Quantum Use in Protocols", n.d.,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/pquip/about/>.

   [TLSWG]    "Transport Layer Security", n.d.,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/tls/about/>.

Acknowledgments

   None yet.

Authors' Addresses

Salz & Aviram           Expires 21 February 2025                [Page 4]
Internet-Draft                tls1.2-frozen                  August 2024

   Rich Salz
   Akamai Technologies
   Email: rsalz@akamai.com

   Nimrod Aviram
   Email: nimrod.aviram@gmail.com

Salz & Aviram           Expires 21 February 2025                [Page 5]