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Continuity Envelope Protocol
draft-vandemeent-continuity-envelope-00

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Author Jasper van de Meent
Last updated 2026-05-17
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draft-vandemeent-continuity-envelope-00
Internet Engineering Task Force                          J. van de Meent
Internet-Draft                                                  Humotica
Intended status: Informational                               14 May 2026
Expires: 15 November 2026

                      Continuity Envelope Protocol
                draft-vandemeent-continuity-envelope-00

Abstract

   This document defines the Continuity Envelope Protocol (CEP), a
   transport-agnostic protocol model for identity-bound messaging
   systems where delivery alone is not sufficient.

   CEP separates a visible envelope surface from sealed internal object
   truth and defines how receivers determine whether a delivered object
   may safely and legitimately continue.  The protocol distinguishes
   between control-plane notification, data-plane object carriage, and
   decision-plane continuation handling.

   CEP is the umbrella model for companion drafts such as TIBET TAT,
   which specifies generic sealed handoff and transfer flow, and IDDrop,
   which profiles that handoff model for identity transfer.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 15 November 2026.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
   described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Architectural Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.1.  Control Plane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.2.  Data Plane  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.3.  Decision Plane  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  Continuity Envelope Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     5.1.  Surface Shape . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     5.2.  ABNF  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     5.3.  Character and Length Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   6.  Sealed Object Truth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     6.1.  Schema Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   7.  Verification States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   8.  Causality and Continuation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   9.  Time and Drift  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   10. Transport Bindings  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     10.1.  Companion Transfer and Application Drafts  . . . . . . .   7
   11. Examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     11.1.  Example Control-Plane Notification . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     11.2.  Example Sealed Manifest Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   12. Interoperability Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   13. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   14. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   15. Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   16. Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Appendix A.  Initial Verification-State Registry  . . . . . . . .   9
   Appendix B.  Changes from -00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Appendix C.  Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10

1.  Introduction

   Classical messaging protocols are primarily optimized for delivery.
   For cross-host agents, sealed artifact exchange, and resumable
   automation, delivery is necessary but insufficient.

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   CEP defines how visible surfaces, sealed truth, and continuation
   decisions relate across transport fabrics.

1.1.  Scope

   This document defines the separation between control-plane
   notification, data-plane carriage, and decision-plane continuation
   handling; the role of the Continuity Envelope as a visible routing
   surface; the distinction between envelope reference, presence,
   verification, and continuation approval; layered time semantics and
   drift handling; and a common vocabulary for causality and
   continuation outcomes.

   This document does not define a single mandatory wire format, a
   single mandatory transport binding, a specific cryptographic
   primitive suite, or a universal trust-scoring algorithm.

   Instead, this document provides the architectural frame into which
   companion drafts fit: TIBET TAT defines the generic touch-and-
   transfer and relay handoff protocol, while IDDrop defines an
   identity-transfer profile over that handoff model.

2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   Continuity Messaging  A messaging model in which the exchanged unit
      is a continuity step rather than delivery alone.

   Continuity Envelope  The visible routing and operator-facing surface
      associated with an object handoff.

   Envelope Reference  A control-plane pointer to an object, without
      implying byte possession or verification.

   Sealed Truth  The normative internal object state carried through
      manifests, signatures, mirrored fields, and causal claims.

3.  Architectural Model

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3.1.  Control Plane

   The control plane carries notification and lightweight exchange
   metadata.  Control-plane data MUST NOT be interpreted as proof that
   the receiver possesses or has verified the underlying object bytes
   unless such proof is explicitly encoded.

3.2.  Data Plane

   The data plane carries the continuity-bearing object itself.
   Examples include local file drop, relay-carried sealed object, peer-
   to-peer artifact transfer, and object fetched by reference.

3.3.  Decision Plane

   The decision plane evaluates whether continuation is legitimate and
   safe.  The decision plane MUST treat sealed truth as authoritative
   where conflict exists.

4.  Problem Statement

   In mailbox-centered systems, a successful delivery event is
   frequently treated as the end of the transport problem.  In
   continuity-bearing systems, delivery is only one stage.

   Several failure classes appear after arrival, including divergence
   between transport metadata and sealed truth, visible names that
   overclaim object identity, control-plane references without local
   bytes, disagreement between time fragments across layers, stale or
   replayed continuity, and missing or invalid causal parentage.

5.  Continuity Envelope Semantics

   The Continuity Envelope provides a visible routing surface for
   operator readability, sorting, grouping, routing hints, freshness
   hints, priority hints, and continuity diagnostics.

   The envelope surface is not the final source of truth.  CEP therefore
   adopts the principle: name is hint, content is truth.

5.1.  Surface Shape

   <time-fragment>.<context>.<profile>.<priority>[.<extension>]

5.2.  ABNF

   The following ABNF, using the notation of [RFC5234], defines a
   conservative baseline grammar for version 1 envelope surfaces:

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   surface-name    = time-fragment "." context "." profile "." priority
                     [ "." extension ]

   time-fragment   = compact-time / dashed-time / date-only
   compact-time    = 8DIGIT "t" 6DIGIT "z"
   dashed-time     = 4DIGIT "-" 2DIGIT "-" 2DIGIT "t"
                     2DIGIT "-" 2DIGIT "-" 2DIGIT "z"
   date-only       = 4DIGIT "-" 2DIGIT "-" 2DIGIT

   context         = 1*48(segment-char)
   profile         = 1*48(segment-char)
   priority        = 1*32(segment-char)
   extension       = 1*48(segment-char)

   segment-char    = LCALPHA / DIGIT / "-"
   LCALPHA         = %x61-7A
   DIGIT           = %x30-39

5.3.  Character and Length Policy

   For portability and operator safety, implementations SHOULD prefer
   lowercase ASCII, dot-delimited segments, and per-segment characters
   from [a-z0-9-].  Implementations SHOULD reject or normalize spaces,
   shell metacharacters, empty segments, and path separators.

   Implementations SHOULD also apply conservative operational limits.
   Representative values are a total surface length of 180 characters or
   less, hard rejection above 200 characters, a preferred segment length
   of 32 characters or less, and a segment upper bound of 48 characters.

6.  Sealed Object Truth

   The sealed object carries the normative internal state.  This MAY
   include manifest data, mirrored surface fields, integrity digests,
   signature data, sealed time fields, causal parentage fields, and
   schema or version identifiers.

   If the envelope surface and sealed truth disagree, the sealed truth
   MUST be treated as authoritative for object identity, while the
   mismatch SHOULD be surfaced as a continuity signal.

6.1.  Schema Identity

   Control-plane metadata and sealed manifest schema identifiers SHOULD
   be consistent for the same object handoff.  An implementation
   receiving a mismatch MAY triage the object, downgrade trust, request
   resynchronization, or continue under local policy if the mismatch is
   understood and bounded.

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7.  Verification States

   CEP requires verification to be layered.  These states MUST NOT be
   collapsed into a single generic "verified" signal when their meanings
   differ.

    +=======================+=========================================+
    | State                 | Meaning                                 |
    +=======================+=========================================+
    | referenced            | Control plane carries a pointer only    |
    +-----------------------+-----------------------------------------+
    | present               | Receiver possesses bytes locally        |
    +-----------------------+-----------------------------------------+
    | digest-matched        | Observed digest matches expected digest |
    +-----------------------+-----------------------------------------+
    | container-verified    | Container structure and integrity       |
    |                       | verified                                |
    +-----------------------+-----------------------------------------+
    | manifest-verified     | Manifest semantics and mirrored fields  |
    |                       | validated                               |
    +-----------------------+-----------------------------------------+
    | continuation-approved | Object may safely continue under policy |
    +-----------------------+-----------------------------------------+

                    Table 1: Initial Verification States

8.  Causality and Continuation

   CEP treats causal legitimacy as distinct from delivery.  An object
   MAY be successfully delivered but still fail continuation checks if
   causal parentage is missing, points to an unknown or invalid
   predecessor, policy forbids progression from the observed lineage, or
   drift exceeds acceptable thresholds.

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     +============+=================================================+
     | Outcome    | Meaning                                         |
     +============+=================================================+
     | continue   | Progression is allowed                          |
     +------------+-------------------------------------------------+
     | triage     | Further inspection is required                  |
     +------------+-------------------------------------------------+
     | fork       | Progression continues along a branch            |
     +------------+-------------------------------------------------+
     | quarantine | Object is isolated pending policy review        |
     +------------+-------------------------------------------------+
     | resync     | Fresh alignment is required before continuation |
     +------------+-------------------------------------------------+

                Table 2: Recommended Continuation Outcomes

9.  Time and Drift

   CEP treats time as layered rather than singular.  Envelope time
   SHOULD be treated as a grouping hint, freshness hint, operator
   readability signal, and early drift indicator.  It MUST NOT be
   treated as the sole authority for continuity legitimacy.

   Sealed internal time fields carry the object's normative time claims.
   Causal order is authoritative for continuation legitimacy.

10.  Transport Bindings

   CEP is transport-agnostic.  Possible bindings include local file
   drop, peer-to-peer delivery, relay-based object transfer, control-
   plane notification over message protocols, object fetch by reference,
   and future bridge transports.

10.1.  Companion Transfer and Application Drafts

   CEP is intended to be read together with companion drafts when a
   concrete transfer or application profile is needed.

   In particular, TIBET TAT defines how a consent-bound sealed handoff
   is executed across proximity, relay, or local network paths, and
   IDDrop defines how identity claims are offered, requested, validated,
   and materialized over that handoff substrate.

   CEP therefore acts as the umbrella model: CEP says how continuity-
   bearing messaging is structured, TAT says how a sealed transfer
   happens, and IDDrop says how identity transfer happens over TAT.

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11.  Examples

11.1.  Example Control-Plane Notification

   {
     "from_agent": "jasper",
     "to_agent": "codex",
     "poll_type": "PUSH",
     "metadata": {
       "envelope_name": "20260514t064148z.message.jasper.normal.tza",
       "envelope_ref": "/var/lib/tibet/inbox/20260514t064148z.message.jasper.normal.tza",
       "schema": "aint-send-v2",
       "verification_state": "referenced"
     }
   }

11.2.  Example Sealed Manifest Fields

   {
     "schema": "aint-send-v2",
     "surface_time_fragment": "20260514t064148z",
     "surface_context": "message",
     "surface_profile": "jasper",
     "surface_priority": "normal",
     "sealed_created_at": "2026-05-14T06:41:48.207135+00:00",
     "content_digest": "sha256:b5ca11489ffadc4438a3815a0d7ea3bc88836dbc2f5951b1e9d7800d784aa675",
     "causal_parent": null
   }

12.  Interoperability Considerations

   To remain interoperable, CEP implementations SHOULD preserve
   predictable envelope grammars, separate reference from verification
   states, expose mismatches rather than hiding them, converge schema
   identity across control and sealed planes, and support both operator
   readability and machine normalization.

13.  Security Considerations

   A receiver MUST NOT interpret a control-plane reference as proof of
   object integrity unless the referenced object has been acquired and
   verified under local policy.

14.  IANA Considerations

   This version of the document makes no IANA requests.

15.  Normative References

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   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC5234]  Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
              Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, January 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5234>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, May 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

16.  Informative References

   [AINS]     van de Meent, J. and R. AI, "AINS: AInternet Name
              Service", 2026.

   [JIS]      van de Meent, J. and R. AI, "JTel Identity Standard",
              2026.

   [TIBET]    van de Meent, J. and R. AI, "Traceable Intent-Based Event
              Tokens", 2026.

   [SSM]      van de Meent, J., "TIBET Semantic Surface Manifest", 2026.

   [TAT]      van de Meent, J. and R. AI, "TIBET TAT: Touch-and-Transfer
              Protocol", 2026.

   [IDDROP]   van de Meent, J. and R. AI, "IDDrop: Identity Drop and
              Acceptance Protocol", 2026.

Appendix A.  Initial Verification-State Registry

   The following values are RECOMMENDED starting points for
   implementation alignment:

   *  referenced

   *  present

   *  digest-matched

   *  container-verified

   *  manifest-verified

   *  continuation-approved

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   Future versions of this document MAY elevate these values into a
   formal registry.

Appendix B.  Changes from -00

   This is the initial -00 version.

Appendix C.  Acknowledgments

   This draft emerged from continuityd, TBZ/TZA, AInternet, and JIS/
   TIBET design work across the HumoticaOS stack, including real
   operational feedback from early cross-host continuity handoffs.

Author's Address

   Jasper van de Meent
   Humotica
   Netherlands
   Email: info@humotica.com
   URI:   https://humotica.com/

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